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pliance options that businesses can utilize to meet
SPCC requirements. Particularly as to Section 112.7 pro-
visions, EPA authorizes owners and operators to evalu-
ate alternative compliance measures, if needed, as long
as equivalent environmental protection is achieved.
Consistent with its improved flexibility initiatives, EPA
also is allowing a variety of formats to meet the require-
ments necessary for SPCC plans. EPA specifically
authorizes any eqUivalent prevention plan as long as it
meets all federal requirements (including a certification
by a professional engineer) and is cross-referenced
from the Part 112 requirement to the appropriate page
in the equivalent plan.
The new SPCC rule affords businesses enhanced
opportunities to achieve compliance consistent with
any existing unique operational needs. As is traditional,
EPA certainly demands compliance, but the new rule
allows businesses to better understand the intent of
each provision and develop equivalent environmental
protection measures that are equally protective of U.S.
navigable waters.
Water Quality Trading:
Bringing Market Forces to Bear
in Watersheds
Alexandra Dapolito Dunn
Just a few months ago, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) took another key step toward
approaching our nation's complex water quality chal-
lenges via a holistic, watershed-based approach. EPA
published in the Federal Register a proposed Water
Quality Trading Policy (proposed policy). 67 Fed. Reg.
34,709 (May 15,2002); www.epa.gov/owow/water-
shed/trading.htm. According to EPA Administrator
Whitman, the proposed policy offers "greater flexibility
and incentives to states, tribes and companies to com-
ply with the Clean Water Act" by providing "incentives
for voluntary reductions from all sources to improve
and maintain the quality of the nation's waters." When
ftnalized in late 2002, the new policy will supersede
President Clinton's 1996 Effluent Trading in
Watersheds Policy, but work in conjunction with the
prior administration's Draft Framework for Watershed-
Based Trading, www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/fram-
work.html. Public comments on the proposed policy
were due July 15, 2002.
Water quality trading (or effluent trading) can have
many meanings depending on a trading program's
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scope or a state's trading regulation or policy. All trad-
ing programs are rooted in the concept that market-
driven systems can yield environmental improvement
more cost-effectively than traditional "command and
control" regulatory approaches. In a trade, one water
discharger cost-effectively reduces its pollutant dis-
charge loading below the regulatory level, generating a
"credit" that can be sold to another discharger that has
fewer pollutant reduction options. The end result
should be cost-effective for all parties and achieve net
water quality benefits.
Trading is not a new concept. In fact, the nation's
ftrst effluent trading program was created in 1984 to
trade phosphorus between point and nonpoint dis-
chargers in Colorado's Dillon Reservoir. Since then,
more than thirty-seven trading programs and related
activities have occurred nationwide. U.S. Effluent
Trading and Offset Projects (Nov. 1999),
www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvrn.pdf.
Lately, trading programs have been specifically designed
to implement total maximum daily loads (TMDLs). For
example, Connecticut and EPA designed a watershed-
based trading program to implement a nitrogen TMDL
in Connecticut's portions of the Long Island Sound.
Idaho and EPA also developed a watershed-based trad-
ing program to implement a phosphorus TMDL for the
lower Boise River.
Common Trading Program Elements
and Trade Structures
Most water quality trading programs contain sever-
al common components: These include pollutant base-
lines and reduction goals; a statement of the eligible
pollutants and dischargers; establishment of geographic
boundaries; provisions to ensure consistency with fed-
eral and state statutes and regulations; systems and
processes to administer, enforce, and track pollutant
trades; trading ratios; and mechanisms to encourage
stakeholder participation.
Four of the most common water quality trading
structures are point/point source; point/nonpoint
source; intrafacility or intrasystem; and pretreatment
trading. In point/point cases, a point source discharger
cost-effectively generates credits and sells them to
another point source discharger. The second discharger
applies the credits to mitigate for new technology or
other controls to meet water quality standards. The
respective sources' Clean Water Act National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits are
used to document and enforce the trade.
Point/nonpoint source trades generally tend to be
more complicated than point/point trades. The most
common approach is triggered by a point source dis-
charger's need to make reductions to achieve water
quality standards. Rather than costly facility upgrades,
the point source discharger will pay a nonpoint source
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in the watershed to implement controls to reduce the
same pollutant. The sources' respective obligations can
be established in a contract. However, state regulatory
agencies often seek to include the trade details in the
point sources' NPDES permit. Point sources can be
reluctant to accept this "dual" liability for nonpoint
source commitments in their permits. If the nonpoint
source fails to achieve the anticipated pollutant reduc-
tions, the point source discharger will face NPDES per-
mit violations.
In intrafacility trading, a discharger reduces costs
by allocating pollutant discharges among multiple out-
falls at a plant. In intrasystem trading, a municipality
with responsibility for stormwater trades pollutant
reductions between the stormwater system and the
wastewater treatment plant. EPA is poised to pilot
intrasystem trading at one city water system this year.
Finally, in pretreatment trading, a wastewater treatment
plant allows trading of certain pollutants, such as heavy
metals, between industrial dischargers to the plant.
Trading Program Challenges
Establishing a successful water quality trading pro-
gram can be challenging when stakeholders disagree
on important program design or implementation issues.
Some of the more thorny issues can include developing
acceptable pollutant data quality and quantity stan-
dards. These scientific protocols are essential for set-
ting trading baselines and for assessing progress toward
reduction goals. However, reaching agreement between
diverse parties in a watershed on what constitutes suf-
ficient data volume, data sources, and data collection
procedures can prove an uphill battle.
Another issue relates to enforcing credit-generation
commitments. While this can be a significant stumbling
block-and at a minimum an omnipresent worry for
dischargers-some trading programs have found ways
to mitigate concerns in this area. For example, under a
TMDL-based trading program in North Carolina's Tar-
Pamlico Basin, the state will underwrite nonpoint
source nitrogen and phosphorus reductions to mini-
mize the trading uncertainties for point sources.
It is also difficult to document trades. Finding a
mutually acceptable place to document the details of a
trade, other than a point source's NPDES permit, can be
difficult. Managing program and transaction costs also
are a concern. Significant costs can be incurred-and
sometimes underestimated-by parties designing and
administering a trading program, setting pollutant base-
lines, negotiating trades, conducting pollutant monitor-
ing, and collecting water quality data. These costs, and
determining their equitable apportionment, can pose
difficulties for an emerging trading program.
Trading ratios establish the unit of pollutant reduc- .
tion that sources must obtain to receive credit for a
unit of load reduction, and setting equitable trading
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ratios is critical to the success of the program. A one-to-
one ratio means one unit of pollutant reduction is
needed to generate one unit of pollutant credit.
Similarly, a two-to-one ratio means that two units of pol-
lutant reduction are needed to generate one unit of pol-
lutant credit. High ratios can deter participation in a
trading program. For example, in a mercury trading pro-
gram contemplated and eventually abandoned for
California's San Francisco Bay, ratios of three-to-one to
five-to-one were considered, limiting point source inter-
est in the program.
Finally, it is important to resolve pre-TMDL trading
issues: A TMDL creates a baseline for reductions by
allocating the pollutant loads to various sources.
Without this baseline, controversy can arise between
watershed members over the reduction obligations of
various dischargers. Furthermore, dischargers in pre-
TMDL trading situations can raise another difficult
issue: Will they receive credit in a frnal TMDL alloca-
tion for their pre-TMDL reductions? Resolving this
question can take some time and effectively hinder pre-
TMDL trading.
When finalized, EPA's trading policy is certain to
provide clean water stakeholders an important tool to
move closer to a watershed-based approach to achiev-
ing water quality goals. Whether water quality trading
will be broadly embraced by states and the regulated
community over time, however, remains to be seen.
CAFE Clash: California,
Carbon Dioxide, Corporate
Average Fuel Economy, and
Other Conundrums
Christine Y LeBel
When Congress declined to pursue a change in
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards early
this year, it quickly became clear that this was not the
end of the matter. On July 22, 2002, in what could be
seen as a throwing-down of the gauntlet on the issue,
California Governor Gray Davis signed into law
California Assembly Bill 1493. This made California, the
largest car market in the United States, the first state in
the nation to actually regulate tailpipe emissions of car-
bon dioxide (C02), The same day, prompted undoubted-
ly by the domino effect California's adoption of legisla-
tion often has on other states and the world, the Alliance
of Automobile Manufacturers made clear in a press
release its intent to challenge the California law. The bat-
tle lines have been drawn in yet another episode of the
continuing saga on the issue of global-warming and the
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